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 The Historically Shifting Sands of 
Reasons to Arbitrate 
James Oldham* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
It is well established that for many centuries, arbitration has been a regular, 
even frequent, method of dispute settlement in the Western World.  Derek Roebuck 
has done path breaking research demonstrating this in his recent book covering the 
middle ages (1154-1558)1 and in his contribution to this symposium, “The English 
Experience: What the First American Colonists Knew of Mediation and Arbitra-
tion.”2  My own work, with the excellent help of co-authors Henry Horwitz and Su 
Jin Kim, has explored English patterns from the late 17th century into the 1800s, 
also tracing the English approach into the American colonies and the early Repub-
lic.  Recourse to arbitration has not always been satisfying, yet for the most part it 
has attracted participants because of four recognized attributes: speed, economy, 
informality, and finality.  Other attributes can also be identified, such as the oppor-
tunity to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, including those with special 
qualifications, and the confidentiality of the process, at least in the private sector.  I 
would add two more attributes that may be somewhat surprising – the availability 
of discovery and the capacity for handling cases of considerable complexity.3  Of 
course, not all of these attributes have been present during all phases of the evolu-
tion of the process. 
What I want to do today is to say a bit more about how arbitration was practiced 
in 18th-century England, with some comparison to the practice in America.  First, 
let me give a brief background snapshot.  Two texts on arbitration were published 
in England in the 17th century – an anonymous 93-page tract titled Arbitriumn Red-
ivivum: Or the Law of Arbitration (1694), and a 250-page text on arbitration by 
Grays Inn barrister John March, first published in 1648.4  March declared that, “Ar-
bitrements were never more in use than now,” and “most men either have been or 
may be Arbitrators.”5  He said, moreover, that “as long as Differences and Conten-
tions arise among men, which will be to the World’s End, certainly the learning of 
Arbitrements will deserve our Knowledge.”6  That was true in 1648, and it is still 
                                                          
 * St. Thomas More Professor of Law and Legal History, Georgetown University Law Center. 
 1. DEREK ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ENGLAND 1154 TO 1558 
(2013). 
 2. Derek Roebuck, Beyond the FAA: Arbitration Procedure, Practice, and Policy in Historical Per-
spective, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2016). 
 3. I emphasize “availability” because one characteristic of traditional labor arbitration in the United 
States has been the absence of discovery. 
 4. See J. MARCH, MARCH’S ACTIONS FOR SLANDER AND ARBITREMENTS (1648). 
 5. J. MARCH, MARCH’S ACTIONS FOR SLANDER AND ARBITREMENTS 149 (W.E. ed. 1674). 
 6. Id. 
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true.  And as the anonymous author of the 1694 Law of Arbitration declared, “Ar-
bitrament is much esteemed and greatly favoured in our Common Law . . . to pre-
vent the great Trouble and frequent Expense of Law-suits.”7 
Some of you will be familiar with the statute that the British Parliament enacted 
in 1698, as drafted by John Locke in his capacity as a member of the London Board 
of Trade.8   For a brief explanation, I will borrow from the presidential address that 
I gave to the National Academy of Arbitrators at its annual meeting in May 2014: 
Locke . . . understood and appreciated the arbitration process. Even in his 
time, it was open to common law courts to refer a case to arbitration when 
the facts of a litigated case seemed to call for it. This might occur, for 
example, when a dispute arose over a construction contract, and the case 
could be referred to an architect or an engineer to arbitrate the disagree-
ment in a final and binding way. This was done by writing out the agree-
ment to arbitrate and entering it in the judicial records as a court order. 
Thus, if either party thereafter refused to honor the agreement, that party 
could be held in contempt of court. 
John Locke was familiar with this process, and he understood that the key to 
effective enforcement of arbitration agreements would be the penalty that would 
attach for dishonoring any such agreement. He perceived that the threat of being 
arrested and imprisoned for contempt of court would provide a strong incentive to 
parties to arbitration agreements to honor those agreements. Thus he recommended 
that the Board of Trade petition Parliament to enact a statute that would make the 
contempt power of the common law courts available to private parties even when 
no actual law suit had been commenced. This is exactly what happened. Parliament 
passed a statute in 1698 that expressly authorized private parties who wished to 
arbitrate their differences to file an affidavit to that effect laying out their agreement 
to arbitrate and its terms, and to have that agreement entered in the court’s order 
books, “subject to all the penalties of contemning a Rule of Court . . . [as if] a suitor 
or defendant in such Court.”9 
And now I want to supplement the historical record with what I think will be 
new information on four of the arbitration attributes: economy, discovery, expertise, 
and complexity. 
II.   ECONOMY 
The traditional advantage of arbitration as a substantially more economical way 
to settle a dispute than full-dress litigation remains true for some types of arbitra-
                                                          
 7. Preface: To the Reader to ARBITRIUMN REDIVIVUM: OR THE LAW OF ARBITRATION (1694) (un-
paginated). 
 8. Henry Horwitz & James Oldham, John Locke, Lord Mansfield, and Arbitration During the Eight-
eenth Century, 36 HIST. J. 137 (1993). 
 9. James Oldham, Presidential Address: Historical Perspectives on the Judicial Enforcement of Ar-
bitration Agreements, in THE TEST OF TIME 27 (Richard N. Block ed., Bloomberg Law 2015) (citations 
omitted). 
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tion, but the advantage is shrinking.  International arbitration has always been com-
plex and expensive, and the costs are rising.10  The same can be said of many do-
mestic commercial arbitration cases.  And non-union employment arbitration has 
broken away from traditional labor arbitration – a traditional heritage in which the 
role of the labor arbitrator was regarded, to some extent, as a public service, accom-
panied by extremely low arbitrator per diems.  Arbitrators in non-union employ-
ment cases now charge healthy hourly rates, and substantial pre-trial discovery is 
common. 
This was much different than in earlier eras.  Consider, for example, the 1825 
Missouri statute “Arbitration: An Act regulating Arbitrations and References.”11  
This Act was Missouri’s version of the 1698 John Locke statute, allowing contro-
versies to be referred to arbitration and to have the written submissions made rules 
of court.12  Section 7 of the Act provided, “[t]hat each arbitrator or referee shall be 
allowed for every day’s attendance to the business of his appointment, one dollar 
and fifty cents.”13  And traveling back to 18th-century England, the contrast is even 
sharper.  Especially interesting are observations by the author of a scarce 1833 pub-
lication, John Palmer’s Supplement to the Attorney and Agent’s Table of Costs.14  
Palmer noted that the practice of referring “mercantile cases to Arbitration after 
they had been called on for trial, very much increased in the latter years of Lord 
Mansfield’s Chief Justiceship.”  He explained that “At first this was attended with 
little expense to the Parties, for the Writer of this [Supplement] remembers when a 
merchant or a gentleman would have felt himself degraded by an offer of payment 
for what was considered a voluntary act of kindness.”15  One of Lord Mansfield’s 
favorite merchants, however, Thomas Gorman of New Broad Street, “had so many 
Cases referred to him that, that he at length made a Charge (a very moderate one) 
for his trouble, and Arbitration became part of his business.”16  Palmer added that, 
“Other merchants followed his example, and were, in fact trading Arbitrators, and 
it became usual to refer Cases of all sorts to Arbitration.”17 Further, 
[t]he late Mr. Lowten of the Temple, who acted as Clerk of Nisi Prius, had 
a great number of references for which he seldom charged more than three 
Guineas.  The practice still increased, and of late years, causes have been 
referred chiefly to Barristers, who now charge Three Guineas for each 
meeting.  So that after the parties have been at the expenses of preparing 
for Trial, employing Counsel, and going into Court (where they have the 
court Fees to pay), they are often at a heavy Charge for an award.18 
                                                          
 10. See e.g., DAVID A.R. WILLIAMS & AMOKURA KAWHARU, WILLIAMS & KAWHARU ON 
ARBITRATION 573 (2011). 
 11. 1825 Mo. Laws 1:137-139. 
 12. See infra p. 47. 
 13. 1825 Mo. Laws 1:137-139. The same sum was to be paid to each witness in attendance, and to 
sheriffs, constables, clerks, and justices of the peace for “services performed in relation to any arbitration 
or reference.”  Id.  (This princely sum, of course, would not be trivial in today’s dollars.) 
 14. I am grateful to Henry Horwitz for this reference.  The tract is in the British Library, BL 514 
k.16(3). See J. PALMER, SUPPLEMENT TO THE ATTORNEY AND AGENT’S TABLE OF COSTS 73 (1833). 
 15. PALMER, supra note 14, at 73. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, Vol. I, 152-53 (1992) (discussing Thomas Lowten). 
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Looking back, perhaps the main significance of John Palmer’s observations is 
not the fact that arbitrators in late 18th century England viewed their arbitration work 
as something of a public service, but rather that by 1833, most cases were apparently 
being referred to barristers, and the costs of the process were spiraling upward.  Un-
der such circumstances, the legalization of the arbitration process surely would soon 
follow. 
III.   DISCOVERY 
It hardly needs saying that in 21st-century litigation, the discovery process 
looms large, both in time and expense.  In 18th-century England, the rules of practice 
were dramatically different.  Let us turn to the two cases that were said to have 
created the rule that private parties could not, by an agreement to arbitrate, “oust 
the common law courts of jurisdiction” – the rule that crossed over to America and 
eventually provoked the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1924.19  I refer 
in particular to the 1743 decision by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, Wellington v. 
Mackintosh.20 
In earlier work, I augmented the brief printed report of Wellington with a more 
extensive manuscript version and argued that the case did not, in fact, truly support 
the “no ousting” proposition.21  The plaintiff in Wellington filed a bill of discovery 
in Chancery, accusing his partner in trade with fraud.  The defendant’s plea (his 
answer) was that the dispute should have gone to arbitration in accordance with the 
arbitration clause in the articles of partnership to which the plaintiff and defendant 
were parties.  Hardwicke rejected the plea, but said, “I would not have it understood, 
that such an agreement might not be made in such kind of articles, and pleaded, but 
such a clause should have in it a power given to the arbitrators to examine the par-
ties, as well as witnesses, upon oath.”22  The remainder of Hardwicke’s opinion, as 
given in the printed report, is as follows: 
But this bill is to discover and be relieved against frauds, impositions, and 
concealments, for which the arbitrators could not examine the parties on 
oath.23  Persons might certainly have made such an agreement as would 
have ousted this court of jurisdiction; but the plea here goes both to the 
discovery and the relief; and if I was to allow the plea as to the relief, I 
                                                          
 19. See Oldham, Presidential Address, supra note 9, at 24-25; Id. at 25 (citing Wellington v. Mackin-
tosh, 2 Atk. 569 (Chancery 1743)); Id. (citing Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (K.B. 1746)). 
 20. Wellington v. Mackintosh, 2 Atk. 569 (Chancery 1743). 
 21. JAMES OLDHAM, Detecting Non-Fiction: Sleuthing Among Manuscript Case Reports for what was 
Really Said, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 136-37 (1995). 
 22. Wellington, 2 Atk. at 570. 
 23. Here, Hardwicke may simply have been saying that it would be beyond the power of an arbitrator 
to examine the parties under oath as to possible criminal behavior, but he may also have been alluding 
to what came to be called the “party witness rule” – that parties to civil litigation were not competent to 
testify under oath, because they were obviously interested parties, and thus not trustworthy.  To modern 
legal eyes, this rule seems preposterous.  See James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth-Century 
English Courtroom, 12 LAW AND HIST. REV. 95, 107-17 (1994) (discussing the party witness rule). 
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could not as to the discovery, and then the court too must admit a discov-
ery, in order to assist the arbitrators, which is not proper for the dignity of 
the court to do.24 
The manuscript report of the Wellington case provides additional details, in-
cluding a brief description of arguments of counsel.25  The hearing was one of sev-
eral arguments on Pleas and Demurrers heard in Lincoln’s Inn Hall during Easter 
Term, 1743.26  The plaintiff and the defendant were partners in Blackwell Hall Fac-
tors, and the Bill prayed a general accounting and satisfaction of what was found to 
be due to the plaintiff.27  Toward that end, the Bill requested discovery about several 
transactions claimed to have been fraudulent.28  The defendant’s Plea recited a 
clause from the Articles of Partnership requiring that any difference that should 
arise between the parties was to be referred to two arbitrators, one to be chosen by 
the plaintiff, the other by the defendant.29  The defendant claimed that he had offered 
to name an arbitrator, but that the plaintiff had absolutely refused to do so, and 
[i]n support of the Plea, the reasonableness of submitting such matters to 
arbitration was insisted on, where the parties might choose proper judges 
for themselves versed & knowing in the matters of their controversy, & 
the Statute of king William [the John Locke statute] was urged to show the 
great encouragement which the Legislature gives to such submissions.30 
The plaintiff responded that 
this Plea plainly goes too far in respect that it tends to cover the prayer of 
discovery as well as the prayer of relief & that it would be the greatest 
hardship upon the plaintiff if he could not compel the defendant to answer 
to the charges of the fraud, which were matters that lay entirely in his own 
knowledge, which discovery could not be had before arbitrators.31 
And besides, “such agreement of the parties ought not to be permitted to oust 
the jurisdiction of the court.”32 
The version of Lord Hardwicke’s opinion in the manuscript report, responding 
to both parties, is as follows: 
                                                          
 24. Id. 
 25. Easter 16 Geo. 2 (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS Coxe 46, folios 166-171) (copy on file with the 
journal). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at folio 168. 
 31. Easter 16 Geo. 2, at folio 169 (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS Coxe 46, folios 166-171) (copy on file 
with the journal). 
 32. Id. at folio 169-70.  The plaintiff’s counsel also said “that there had been a case where upon this 
foundation such a plea as is now pleaded was overruled, but the name of this case or the time when it 
was so determined was forgot.” Id. at folio 170. See OLDHAM, Detecting Non-Fiction, supra note 21 at 
137. 
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Lord Chancellor Hardwicke [said that] he would not declare that a plea of 
this kind could not be good.  But [he said] if it was good it would extend 
as well to the discovery as the relief prayed for by the Bill, for this Court 
will not allow Bills of Discovery to aid proceedings before arbitrators.  But 
[he said] he thought this plea [was] not good, for that the defendant in 
support of it ought to answer to the charges of fraud, which here he had 
not done.  But as to the covenants tending to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Court, he thought that an objection of no weight, for most certainly men 
may submit their differences to the arbitration of persons chose (sic) by 
them without applying to the Courts of Public Justice.33 
So for present purposes, the takeaway from Wellington is that even though it 
was beneath the dignity of the Court of Chancery to grant a Bill of Discovery in aid 
of a pending or proposed arbitration, the Chancellor said that the parties could in 
their arbitration clause give the arbitrator special powers, such as to examine the 
parties and the witnesses under oath. 
At this point, asking your indulgence, I should like to leap across the pond and 
refer to an opinion given in 1845 by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.   In the 
address that I have already mentioned that I gave to the National Academy of Arbi-
trators in May 2014, I took issue with the comments Justice Story made in Tobey v. 
Bristol,34 a case in which the plaintiff sought judicial enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement allegedly breached by the defendant.  Justice Story declared (incorrectly, 
in my view) that “it cannot be correctly said, that public policy, in our age, generally 
favors or encourages arbitrations, which are to be final and conclusive, to an extent 
beyond that which belongs to the ordinary operations of the common law.”35  He 
claimed (also, I think, incorrectly) that judicial enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments occurred only pursuant to legislation that equipped arbitrators with all of the 
powers that judges would have, and that the arbitration decisions could always be 
appealed to the courts. 36  In his Commentaries on the Law of Partnership as a 
Branch of Commercial and Maritime Jurisprudence,37 Story was more specific.  He 
said that no action at common law could be brought to enforce such an arbitration 
agreement, as “it is against the policy of the common law, and has a tendency to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts, which are provided by the Govern-
ment with ample means to entertain and decide all legal controversies.”38  He added, 
moreover, that there could be no specific enforcement in equity of any arbitration 
clause, “not merely upon the ground of public policy, but also upon the ground of 
the utter inadequacy of arbitrators to administer entire justice between the parties, 
from a defect of power in them to examine under oath, and to compel the production 
of papers.”39 
So what should we think about Justice Story’s observations?  Lord Chancellor 
Hardwicke in 1743 saw no reason why parties to arbitration agreements could not                                                           
 33. Easter 16 Geo. 2, at folio 170-71 (Lincoln’s Inn Library, MS Coxe 46, folios 166-171) (copy on 
file with the journal). 
 34. Tobey v. Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). 
 35. Id. at 1321. 
 36. See Oldham, Presidential Address, supra note 9, at 24 (discussing the Tobey case). 
 37. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND 
MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE (1841). 
 38. Id. at 311. 
 39. Id. 
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include provisions that would give arbitrators interrogation and discovery powers.  
And in fact, that is exactly what happened during the second half of the 18th century 
in the English practice of referring litigated cases to arbitration. 
Many years ago, while studying Lord Mansfield’s long run as Chief Justice of 
the Court of King’s Bench (1756-1788), I thumbed through every page of the 
King’s Bench Rule Books for the 32-year period.40  I extracted information from all 
of the arbitration agreements that had been entered.  Most of these agreements 
would have been reached by counsel for the parties during the conduct of jury trials, 
usually at the suggestion of Mansfield as the sitting trial judge.  These were called 
“references,” that is, the parties in each such case agreed to suspend the jury trial 
and to refer their dispute to arbitration, consenting also to have their agreement 
made a “rule of court,” that is, a court order.  Also included in the Rule Books were 
arbitration agreements “by submission,” that is, arbitration agreements that were 
“submitted” by affidavits as if there were pending lawsuits, though in fact the cap-
tions entered in the rule books were “pretend” lawsuits, as authorized by the John 
Locke statute of 1698.41  As stated earlier, the advantage of entering the agreement 
in the Rule Books was that the contempt power then became available if either party 
to the agreement subsequently dishonored it.    
I then catalogued these agreements to arbitrate that had been entered in the Rule 
Books and published the results for the references as a lengthy Appendix to the 
Mansfield volumes, tabulating the case names, the originating lawsuit, the names 
and occupations of the designated arbitrators (given for most of the cases), and de-
scribing any special features that appeared in the agreements.  In an explanatory 
footnote, I noted that early in Mansfield’s time as Chief Justice certain provisions 
began to appear regularly, soon becoming standard.42  These included two proce-
dural provisions of significance to the present topic, discovery: authorization by the 
parties (1) for the witnesses to be sworn, also for the parties to give sworn testimony 
(notwithstanding the fact that they could not testify under oath in court because of 
the party witness rule);43 and (2) for the production of relevant documentary evi-
dence.44 
In London in 1849, only a few years after Justice Story died, Francis Russell 
published the first edition of A Treatise on the Power and Duty of an Arbitrator and 
the Law of Submissions and Awards, 927 pages long, and an American edition was 
published in Philadelphia the same year.45  This volume is an extraordinary trove of 
information about English arbitration practice, with full explanations of statutory 
developments, including a major statute enacted in 1833-34, 3 & 4 W. IV.  This 
statute expressly authorized arbitrators in references or submissions that had been 
made rules of court to administer oaths themselves, and to compel the production 
                                                          
 40. The Rule Books for the Court of King’s Bench are held by The National Archives in London, 
known as the Public Record Office when I did my research.  The plea side Rule Books are at KB 125.  
Each volume contains a large variety of official King’s Bench orders.  These were copied daily by hand 
into the books by court clerks. King’s Bench Rule Books, Plea Side, The National Archives (Kew, Lon-
don) 125/155 – 125/173 (1757-1788) [hereinafter RULE BOOKS]. 
 41. 9 Will. 3, c. 15. 
 42. OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW, VOL. II 1541 n.5 
(1992). 
 43. Id. at 1543 n.11. See supra note 23 and accompany text (discussing the party witness rule). 
 44. OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 42, at 1542 n.8. 
 45. FRANCIS RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON THE POWER AND DUTY OF AN ARBITRATOR AND THE LAW OF 
SUBMISSIONS AND AWARDS (1849). 
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of relevant documentary evidence. 46  Russell described the “old practice for swear-
ing witnesses” as follows: 
As before the recent statute the arbitrator had no power to administer an 
oath, it was usual, when a cause was referred at Nisi Prius [at a jury trial], 
and the witnesses were in court, for each attorney to write down the names 
of his witnesses, together with the name of the cause, upon a piece of pa-
per, and give it to the crier of the court, who would thereupon swear the 
witnesses.  In other cases, when the submission contained a clause for mak-
ing it a rule of court, or when the reference was by rule of court, or judge’s 
order, a similar list was made out, stating also whether the persons to be 
sworn were parties or only witnesses.  It was taken to the judge’s cham-
bers, or to the court in Westminster, and the judge’s clerk had the witnesses 
sworn, and gave a memorandum to that effect signed by the judge.47 
This procedure was no longer necessary after the statute of 3 & 4 W. IV – as 
Russell wrote, “The more usual and convenient course now is, to have the witnesses 
sworn before the arbitrator at the meeting at which they attend to give their evi-
dence.”48  The statute of 3 & 4 W. IV also expressly authorized the compulsory 
attendance of witnesses and production of documents, the latter if necessary by a 
subpoena duces tecum, and these orders could be obtained from a judge in cham-
bers.49  Thus, to close the loop, Justice Story’s comments in the Tobey case about 
the discovery limitations of arbitration were outdated and inaccurate. 
IV.   EXPERTISE 
Earlier I described the arbitration agreements that were entered in the King’s 
Bench Rule Books for the plea side (civil cases) from 1755 through 1786.50  Most 
of these cases were “references” from jury trials in which “a juror was withdrawn,” 
that is, the jury trial was suspended in order to refer the matter to arbitration, with 
the expectation that a final and binding award would ensue.51  Also a large number 
of Rule Book orders were “submissions,” entered by affidavit and bond as if real 
lawsuits, even though they were merely free-standing agreements to arbitrate that 
had been authorized by the John Locke statute to be entered as rules of court.  The 
Rule Book entries for all of these references and submissions include not only the 
discovery provisions already discussed,52 but also the names and occupations of the 
designated arbitrators. 
Several surprises are revealed by the composite picture.53  First, very few men 
were significant repeaters as arbitrators.  One “gentleman” stood out – Thomas 
                                                          
 46. See id. at 172-78 (citing and quoting  3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 42, §§ 40 & 41). 
 47. Id. at 176-77 (footnotes omitted). 
 48. Id. at 177. 
 49. Id. at 172-73. 
 50. See supra notes 40-42 and accompany text. 
 51. See OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 18, at 157. 
 52. See supra p. 47. 
 53. The summary statistics that follow are derived from my own catalog of all of the arbitration rules 
of court extracted from the King’s Bench Rule Books for the years 1756-1786. See RULE BOOKS, supra 
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Lowten, mentioned earlier,54 to whom over 60 cases were referred across the years 
covered.  Only five others heard more than five cases.55  Nearly two dozen arbitra-
tors heard three to five cases each; almost 75 heard two cases each; and an amaz-
ingly large number, approximately 770 men, served as arbitrators in only a single 
case each, and the range of occupations in this group was exceedingly large.56  Es-
quires, merchants, and gentlemen predominated, followed by substantial groups of 
surveyors and carpenters or builders.57  It is clear that in a great many of these cases, 
the arbitrator’s expertise was distinctly relevant to the nature of the dispute.  Count-
less examples could be given, but a representative selection from cases tried by Lord 
Mansfield will serve: 
 
Examples of Reliance on Arbitrator Expertise 
 
Occupation Arbitrator Case Name Dispute MMSS page58 
Architect George Dance Chapman v. 
Rutland (1764) 
work & labor 
performed 
1551 
Architect James Paine Wheeler v. 
Jones (1777) 
ownership of a 
wall 
1587 





Carpenter William Edwards Verren v. Bell 
(1760) 
work done for 
defendant 
1547 





Carpenter Edward Burton Wetherall v. 
Pitstow (1773) 
carpenter’s bill 1572 
Carpenter Robert Hudson Bass v. Stanley 
(1777) 
obstructing 
right of way 
1586 
Grocer Samuel Smith Sukring v. 
Pritzler (1773) 
sale of sugar 1573 
Hosier Armstrong Jones Thompson v. 
Cherry (1766) 
value of goods 
sold 
1556 
Merchant James Tierney Curtis v. Dun-
bar (1776) 














                                                          
note 40.  That catalog is far too long to be reproduced here; however, salient features of all of the refer-
ences to arbitration that were made rules of court in trials conducted by Lord Mansfield are in print.  See 
OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 42, at 1540-1625 (Appendix E). 
 54. See OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 55. See RULE BOOKS, supra note 40. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Page references are to cases catalogued in Appendix E in volume II, The Mansfield Manuscripts. 
See OLDHAM, MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 42, at Vol. II Appendix E. 
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V.   COMPLEXITY 
In addition to specific occupational expertise that related to the subject matter 
of the dispute being arbitrated, some cases were so convoluted and complex that 
they were considered too difficult for a jury to comprehend, and were instead re-
ferred to arbitration, often to skilled barristers.59  Sometimes complicated business 
lawsuits in England in the late 18th century would never have reached a jury because 
they were not “suits at common law” but were suits in equity in the Court of Chan-
cery, where there were no juries.60  The most common example of this type of case 
was the suit in which the plaintiff sought an accounting, for example in activities of 
a partnership or in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Such a case would ordinarily be re-
ferred to one of the twelve Masters in Chancery to work out the accounts.61  In the 
1794 case of Barnard v. Assignees of Price, the plaintiff had filed initially in the 
Court of Chancery seeking an accounting from the assignees of Price, after Price 
had become bankrupt. 62  At the plaintiff’s request, the case was referred to a Master 
in Chancery, but to everyone’s surprise, the Master punted, sending the case to the 
Court of King’s Bench for the verdict of a jury “on the state of this long and com-
plicated account.”63  The case was presented to Chief Justice Kenyon and a special 
jury of merchants on December 18, 1794 by two of the leading barristers of the day, 
William Garrow and Thomas Erskine.64  According to the report of the case in The 
Times, Garrow said that “the case consisted of such volumes of paper, that he should 
have no difficulty to say, without danger of being contradicted, that it was abso-
lutely impossible for a Court and a Jury to decide that cause.”65  He said that if it 
had originated in a court of law, “it would have been considered as one of those 
causes, which, from unavoidable necessity, must be referred to arbitration.”66  Gar-
row, therefore, suggested to Erskine that they should do just that—send the case to 
arbitration.67  Erskine said that “he had no objection to refer it, provided they could 
get some gentleman (who must be a young man) to devote the remainder of his days 
to this business.”68  In the end, Garrow and Erskine agreed to refer the case to 
(young) barristers George Holroyd and John Bayley.69  Lord Kenyon said “it could 
not be in better hands; and the verdict would be entered up, as the arbitrators should 
direct.”70 
Brief reports of cases with comparable outcomes appeared intermittently in The 
Times.  In Handy v. Camden, for example, counsel for the plaintiff was reported to 
have said that “he must go through accounts to upwards of 10,000, and he thought 
it would have been proper to have brought their night-caps, unless they chose to 
                                                          
 59. See James Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment Guar-
antee of Trial by Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L. J. 1031, 1033-35 (2010). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1033. 
 62. THE LONDON TIMES, Dec. 19 1794, at 3. 
 63. Id. See also Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity Exception, supra note 61 at 1033-34. 
 64. THE LONDON TIMES, Dec. 19, 1794, at 3. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. THE LONDON TIMES, Dec. 19, 1794, at 3.  In the news account, Bayley is spelled Baillie.  Id. 
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refer it.”71  The parties chose to refer it to a Mr. Norris of the Sun Fire Office.72  In 
an account on August 18, 1791 of the summer assize docket at Bury St. Edmund’s, 
The Times included a paragraph on a case being presented by counsel James Mingay 
to a special jury, “an action against the Trustees of the navigable communication 
between Ipswich and Stowmarket,” and 
after getting a little way into the cause, and the jury confessing themselves 
not competent to decide on the skill or merits of canal-cutting, nor of the 
value of materials, nor of their use or necessity, and not much elucidation 
being expected from either the Bar or the Bench on such a subject, the 
parties agreed to refer the matters in dispute to a gentleman of skill and 
experience in this branch of the business.73 
Similarly, in the combined cases of Smith v. Searles and Searles v. Smith that 
were to have been tried before King’s Bench Justice Gould and a special jury, “the 
learned Judge recommended references as the best mode of complete investigation; 
and in pursuance of this advice, Mr. Serjeant Runnington was appointed the sole 
arbitrator.”74  
Two more examples that came before Mansfield’s successor as Chief Justice 
of King’s Bench, Sir Lloyd Kenyon, deserve mention.  In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 
the plaintiff and defendant were brothers “who were reported to have sunk a half a 
million of money in iron works.”75  The plaintiff accused his brother of having bro-
ken up some of the iron works, and 
LORD KENYON said, this was a cause of all others that pressed the parties 
to go to a reference.  Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were men of 
character.  A cause of this sort was so multifarious, that it would be  im-
possible ever to get to the end of it at Nisi Prius.  It was pursuing a shadow, 
and he was very clear that it ought to go to a reference.  It appeared that 
there were three Bills in Chancery, each of them several thousand sheets 
long.  His Lordship thought it was of some importance for the parties to 
understand that the Court of Chancery would not settle all these accounts 
for at least these fifty years, so that if it continued in that Court, it would 
descend as a legacy to their Executors, Administrators, &c . . . .  By the 
recommendation of the Lord Chief justice, it was agreed, that all subjects 
in dispute between the parties, should be referred to a number of Iron-
Masters that should be elected by the parties.76 
Finally, in Assignees of Lewis and Potter v. The Assignees of Livsey, Hargrave, 
and Co., a motion was argued before the full Court of King’s Bench to set aside an 
arbitration award that had sorted out complicated accounts in the insolvency of both 
                                                          
 71. THE LONDON TIMES, Aug. 16, 1787, at 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. THE LONDON TIMES, Aug. 18, 1791, at 4. 
 74. THE LONDON TIMES, Nov. 8, 1792, at 3. 
 75. THE LONDON TIMES, Oct. 7, 1795, at 2. 
 76. Id. 
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parties, accounts worth approximately £340,000.77  The arbitrators had been ap-
pointed after eight years of litigation had failed to resolve matters.78  Among the 
observations by Chief Justice Kenyon, as reported by The Times, were the follow-
ing: 
Arbitrations were extremely beneficial in many cases, and in no instance 
were they more beneficial than in this very case, where there was an im-
mense number of commercial accounts between two houses trading to an 
extent . . . almost unexampled in the history of the commerce of this coun-
try.  In order to settle both the law and the facts of this case, the parties 
selected three Merchants of competent knowledge, and of minds suffi-
ciently enlightened on the subject, . . . who went through the whole of it . 
. . , and after all this, the Court was to let the whole loose again, and open 
the door to fresh litigation? . . . his Lordship said that he had not the least 
particle of doubt that justice had been done, but he did not go on that 
ground, but on the ground that it had been decided by Judges of the parties 
own choosing, and as nothing improper was imputed to them in the manner 
of deciding it, he should dread the consequences of opening it again.79 
Lord Kenyon, therefore, thought that the motion to set aside the award should 
be denied.  And according to the report in The Times, “The other Judges were of the 
same opinion” – “[t]hey thought it had been decided honestly, ably, and uprightly, 
and that the facts submitted to the Arbitrators were peculiarly fit for the decision of 
commercial men.”80 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Even in the late 18th and early 19th centuries there were, of course, those who 
were not enthusiastic about the arbitration process.  One of our founding fathers, 
Daniel Webster, was an outspoken critic.  As he once wrote: “No man, in this age, 
contends for the illiberal constructions and black-lettered niceties of the ancient 
gown-men; nor will a wise man push to the other extreme, and overwhelm all cer-
tainty and all rule in the chaos of arbitration principles.”81  Yet, as the cases that 
have been discussed demonstrate, many of Webster’s contemporaries in the English 
legal community turned to arbitration to avoid the chaos of trying to present and 
argue complex matters, especially financial ones, to a jury.  The arbitration process 
also provided a way to dodge restrictive evidentiary rules that governed the com-
mon law courts, such as the party witness rule and the need to go to Chancery for 
purposes of discovery.  And perhaps most important was the advantage of placing 
a dispute before an arbitrator who possessed expertise or skills that allowed him to 
                                                          
 77. THE LONDON TIMES, Feb. 11, 1797, at 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL PAPERS 172 (Alfred S. Konefsky & Andrew J. King, 
eds., 1982). 
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understand the dispute much more readily and fully that would have been true of a 
common law judge.82 
Arbitration today is certainly not the bargain that it once was, but it remains 
economically preferable to litigation in many contexts.  Also, today, the discovery 
advantage is often its absence rather than its availability.  But overall, the process 
of arbitration, venerable across at least six centuries, continues to be of substantial 
utility as a civilized, peaceable means of final and binding dispute settlement. 
 
                                                          
 82. As I have discussed elsewhere, another choice that was available and advantageous was to pay 
extra for a special jury, often a jury of merchants, who would often know more about a mercantile dispute 
than the sitting judge.  This was often done, but arbitration was simpler, and, as shown by the 1791 Bury 
St. Edmunds case (above), even special juries had their limits.  See Oldham, On the Question of a Com-
plexity Exception, supra note 61, at 1041-51. 
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